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INTRODUCTION

Since 2006, the United States Supreme Court under Chief Justice Roberts
has decided four employee retaliation cases.1 In all four, the employee won.2 So,

* Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago; Professor of Law Emeritus, Seton Hall
University. Versions of this paper were presented at the 2008 Southeastern Association of Law
Schools conference in Palm Beach and at the Florida State University College of Law. I want to
thank the participants at these presentations for their input. I also need to thank my longtime
coauthors, Charlie Sullivan and Rebecca Hanner White, for all they have helped me learn about
employment discrimination. Joe Mitzenmacher and Fred LeBaron of the Loyola Law School
Library were very helpful. And, as always, thanks to Margaret L. Moses and to Loyola University
for its financial support.
† This Article was peer-reviewed, prior to selection and publication, as part of the South
Carolina Law Review’s Peer Review Pilot Program. For more information on the peer review
program, see John P. Zimmer and Jason P. Luther, Peer Review As an Aid to Article Selection in
Student-Edited Legal Journals, 60 S.C. L. REV. 959 (2009).
1. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846
(2009); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S.
Ct. 1931 (2008); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
2. This Article was written and submitted for publication before the Court decided
Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, 129 S. Ct.
846 (2009). In Crawford, the Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Souter, decided that the
opposition clause of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a) protected an employee,
Crawford, whose employer asked her to answer questions in an in-house investigation into whether
a school district’s employee relations director had engaged in sexual harassment. Id. at 849–50.
Crawford told the questioner that the director had subjected her to repeated sexual harassment. Id. at
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the question is whether the Supreme Court is pro-employee, at least in retaliation
cases. My answer is yes, but not because the Court is “liberal” in the
conventional political sense of Democratice with a capital “D,” nor in the sense
of the classic canon of liberal statutory construction.3 Although conventional
wisdom might be that a Republican-appointed Court4 would be pro-employer,
when one understands the pragmatic approach a majority of these Justices take it
comes as no surprise that the Court is pro-employee. My thesis is that these
decisions are primarily a product of a pragmatic approach to judicial decision
making.5 To examine that thesis, Part II discusses the Court’s three recent

849. Subsequently, the employer discharged her and other employees who responded similarly,
although the employer claimed it discharged her for embezzlement. Id. at 849–50. Because the
employee also won in Crawford, its holding does not alter an examination of the Justices’
approaches. Although this Article does not discuss the case in depth, Crawford reinforces the
following analysis.
3. Judge Posner characterizes the Supreme Court, as opposed to lower federal courts, as a
political body. See RICHARD A. P OSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 269–323 (2008) [hereinafter POSNER,
HOW JUDGES THINK]; see also Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term, Foreword: A
Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 53–54 (2005) [hereinafter Posner, A Political Court]
(arguing that many of the Supreme Court’s landmark cases were ultimately political). Nevertheless,
he does not characterize all decisions of the Court as political, only those where it decides
constitutional issues: “No responsible student of the judicial system supposes that
‘politics’ . . . drives most decisions, except in the Supreme Court, which indeed is largely a political
court when it is deciding constitutional cases.” POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra, at 8. When he
describes the decisions as “political,” he means in the sense of making choices among policy
objectives and the means to achieve those objectives, not in the sense of party politics. Id. at 8–10.
4. Republican Presidents appointed seven of the current Justices. See Biographies of Current
Members of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last
visited June 2, 2009).
5. In general, Judge Posner characterizes judicial thinking as either being legalist (i.e.,
formalist) or pragmatic. See POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 3, at 39–41. The fundamental
difference is that legalists or formalists look backward to rules of law and attempt to apply them
syllogistically to a given fact situation. See id. Pragmatists look forward to the consequences of the
decision to the parties involved and also to the development of the law more broadly. See id.
Posner’s definition of pragmatism is as follows: “In law, pragmatism refers to basing a judicial
decision on the effects the decision is likely to have, rather than on the language of a statute or of a
case, or more generally on a preexisting rule. So it is the opposite of legalism . . . .” Id. at 40.
Judicial pragmatism, as endorsed by Judge Posner, is not “anything goes” decisionmaking:
The pragmatic judge is a constrained pragmatist. He is boxed in, as other judges are, by
norms that require of judges impartiality, awareness of the importance of the law’s being
predictable enough to guide the behavior of those subject to it (including judges!), and a
due regard for the integrity of the written word in contracts and statutes. The box is not so
small that it precludes his being a political judge, at least in a nonpartisan sense. But he
need not be one unless “political” is given the broadest of its possible meanings . . . in
which the “political” is anthing that has the slightest whiff of concern for policy. A
pragmatic judge assesses the consequences of judicial decisions for their bearing on
sound public policy as he conceives it. But it need not be policy chosen by him on
political grounds as normally understood.
Id. at 13. For Posner, “[l]egalism drives most judicial decisions, though generally they are the less
important ones for the development of legal doctrine or the impact on society.” Id. at 8. Thus,
pragmatism comes to the fore for some judges when legalism runs out, leaving the judge with a lawmaking function. This backward versus forward orientation of the way judges think is developed
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decisions. Next, Part III analyzes the positions of the Justices who authored these
opinions to see if a pragmatic approach governed how they addressed the issue
of employee retaliation, which resulted in the plaintiffs winning. Part IV
attempts to place these Justices on a spectrum from pragmatist to formalist.
Finally, Part V concludes that, interestingly, while the Justices writing opinions
in these specific cases can generally be classified as pragmatic, they also
employed a somewhat formalist approach; the opinions predominantly relied
upon precedent and perhaps employed a new canon of statutory interpretation.
II. THREE RETALIATION DECISIONS
A. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White
In its first term, the Roberts Court decided Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White.6 The case raised the question of what types of retaliatory
actions by an employer are covered by § 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII).7 After Sheila White complained that her supervisor had
sexually harassed her, Burlington officials removed her from her job driving a
forklift truck and assigned her to do standard track laborer tasks.8 When she filed
a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), her
employer suspended her without pay, allegedly for insubordination.9 A
subsequent in-house investigation concluded that she had not been insubordinate,
so Burlington reinstated her and gave her backpay for the thirty-seven days she
had been suspended.10 Nevertheless, she pursued her claims and won a jury

more fully in Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B. Sanders, Posner, Hayek, and the Economic Analysis of
Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 559, 586 (2008).
6. 548 U.S. 53 (2006). See Ernest F. Lidge III, What Types of Employer Actions Are
Cognizable Under Title VII?: The Ramifications of Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v.
White, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 497 (2007), for a discussion of the ramifications of Burlington on
employer actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
7. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 56–57 (citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000)). Section 704(a) reads as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any
of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining,
including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a
labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for
membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.
8. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 58.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 58–59.
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verdict.11 Rejecting an earlier panel decision, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc,
found for White and affirmed the verdict.12
Justice Breyer, in an opinion joined by seven other members of the Court,
affirmed the lower court judgment.13 The Court first held that the antiretaliation
provision extends to employer actions that reach beyond the employer’s place of
business.14 The Court justified its holding by noting that the “antiretaliation
provision seeks to secure [the] primary objective [of ending workplace
discrimination] by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation)
with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic
guarantees.”15 The Act cannot achieve this purpose if “[a]n employer can
effectively retaliate against an employee by taking actions not directly related to
his employment or by causing him harm outside the workplace.” 16 Thus, for
example, a plaintiff could bring a § 704(a) action to challenge an employer who
retaliated by “blackballing” the plaintiff to another employer.
The second part of the holding involved the severity of the impact on the
employee necessary to support a retaliation action.17 Not all retaliatory actions of
an employer, whether at the employer’s workplace or beyond, violate § 704(a).18
The Court determined that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is limited to
employer actions that are serious enough to be materially adverse to a reasonable
employee or applicant.19 To prevent trivial complaints from being the focus of
litigation, “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found
the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well
might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination.”20 By using the term “reasonable employee,” the Court
intended that § 704(a)’s “standard for judging harm must be objective.”21 But the
opinion then went on to soften that standard by adding that the materiality of the
challenged action is judged “from the perspective of a reasonable person in the

11. Id. at 59.
12. Id. (citing White v. Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 791 (6th Cir. 2004)
(en banc) (affirming the district court’s denial of Burlington Northern’s motion for judgment as a
matter of law and remanding for a hearing on damages); White v. Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry.
Co., 310 F.3d 443, 445–46 (6th Cir. 2002) (panel) (reversing the district court and setting aside the
jury’s verdict)).
13. Id. at 56. Justice Alito concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the Court’s
interpretation of the statute. Id. at 73–80 (Alito, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 67.
15. Id. at 63.
16. Id. at 62. Limiting protection against retaliation to acts affecting an employee’s “terms,
conditions, or status of employment,” id. at 61, would arguably create a safe harbor for an
employer’s retaliatory actions beyond the workplace.
17. Id. at 67.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 68.
20. Id. (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
21. Id.
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plaintiff’s position.”22 The Court further stated that the “significance of any given
act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances. Context
matters.”23 Thus, “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good
manners” that the employee might subjectively perceive as materially adverse
would not be materially adverse to a reasonable person, but the context in which
these actions occur might color how a reasonable person would view the
circumstances.24
This test is odd because it requires a plaintiff alleging discrimination and
who claims to have suffered retaliation for complaining to prove that a
reasonable worker would have been dissuaded from complaining in the face of
the potentially severe reaction by the employer. This does not exactly require the
plaintiff to prove she is unreasonable for having complained, but it comes close.
This test insulates retaliatory acts from attack if a court considers them too minor
or insignificant to justify the use of court resources.25 Thus, an employer might
be able to escape liability for a clearly retaliatory act if that act was, for example,
the imposition of an unjustified evaluation in response to an employee’s
complaint of discrimination where that evaluation did not have sufficient
immediate employment consequences to dissuade a reasonable person from
complaining of discrimination in the first instance.26 A court might consider a
truly retaliatory act a minor annoyance, no more serious than an exacerbated
harrumph of a supervisor in response to an employee’s complaint of
discrimination.
B. CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries
In its second term, the Roberts Court heard two retaliation decisions that also
resulted as wins for the employee plaintiff. In CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries,27
the plaintiff, a black employee, claimed his employer dismissed him because he
complained to company managers about discrimination against another black
employee.28 Section 1981, a surviving part of post-Civil War civil rights

22. Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 69.
24. Id. at 68–69.
25. See id. (“[I]t is important to separate significant from trivial harms.”).
26. The Burlington Court provided the following example of when a reasonable person might
choose not to report discrimination: “A supervisor’s refusal to invite an employee to lunch is
normally trivial, a nonactionable petty slight. But to retaliate by excluding an employee from a
weekly training lunch that contributes significantly to the employee’s professional advancement
might well deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination.” Id. at 69.
27. 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008).
28. Id. at 1954. The plaintiff initially claimed the dismissal was discriminatory because of his
race as well as because of retaliation. Id. Originally, he brought claims under Title VII as well as
§ 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Id. However, based on various procedural grounds, the
district court dismissed his Title VII claims and granted summary judgment in favor of CBOCS
West, Inc. on the § 1981 claims. Id. While upholding much of the district court’s ruling, the Seventh
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legislation, provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”29 In a 7–2 decision, Justice Breyer,
writing for the Court, found that “the provision encompasses a complaint of
retaliation against a person who has complained about a violation of another
person’s contract-related ‘right’” in the context of an employment contract.30 In
reaching the conclusion that § 1981 protects against retaliation for workers who
challenge race discrimination, the Court did not address the scope of that
protection.31 However, because the Court found the plaintiff had a sufficient
§ 1981 claim based on his complaint that the employer had discriminated against
another of its employees,32 presumably the statute protects employees from
retaliation for having complained about race discrimination against another
person.33 CBOCS West was another victory for an employee bringing a
retaliation claim.
C. Gomez-Perez v. Potter
Gomez-Perez v. Potter34 was the second retaliation decision in the 2007
Term of Court. Myrna Gomez-Perez was a federal postal worker who claimed
her employer retaliated against her after she complained of age discrimination.35
In 1974, Congress extended the protection of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 196736 (ADEA) to include federal workers.37 Rather than
simply amending the existing statutory provisions to include employees of the
federal government by amending the definitions of “employee” or “employer,”

Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the § 1981 retaliation claim. Id. The § 1981 retaliation claim
was the only issue which advanced to the Supreme Court. Id.
29. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000) (corresponds to the Act of May
31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144).
30. CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1954. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented. Id.
at 1961 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. See id. at 1956–61 (limiting discussion of § 1981’s scope to the affect of post-contractformation conduct).
32. Id. at 1961.
33. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006),
for a statute similar to § 1981 granting a cause of action for discrimination, and see Jackson v.
Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167, 174–77 (2005), for a case holding that Title IX
protects a male basketball coach from retaliation for complaining that the girls’ basketball team did
not receive equal access or treatment.
34. 128 S. Ct. 1931 (2008).
35. Id. at 1935.
36. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634
(2006)). On January 29, 2009, President Obama signed an amendment to ADEA that increases the
amount of time in which an employee can make a claim. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 4, 123 Stat. 5, 6 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)).
37. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(A), 88 Stat. 55, 58
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2006)) (amending the ADEA to include a public
agency as “any person acting . . . in the interest of an employer ”).
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Congress followed the pattern it had earlier established in amending Title VII.38
Congress enacted a provision that did not focus on any specific employment
practices but instead created a general ban on age discrimination in federal
employment.39 Specifically, “All personnel actions affecting employees or
applicants for employment who are at least 40 years of age . . . shall be made
free from any discrimination based on age.”40 The question presented in GomezPerez was “whether the statutory phrase ‘discrimination based on age’ include[d]
retaliation based on the filing of an age discrimination complaint.”41 The Court,
in a 6–3 decision written by Justice Alito, found that it did.42 This was the third
victory in a row for employees in retaliation cases.
D. Summary
Putting these three Roberts Court retaliation decisions together provides a
potentially robust jurisprudence protecting employees from retaliatory actions by
employers. Workers need not prove that the retaliatory actions occurred on the
employer’s workplace, but protection extends to employer actions occurring
outside the workplace.43 Further, the retaliation need not be limited to ultimate
employment decisions, such as discharge, as long as the plaintiff can establish
that the employer’s conduct was materially adverse in the sense that it would
likely dissuade a reasonable person from opposing the discrimination in the first
place.44 Additionally, the reasonable person is someone who views the situation
from the perspective of a person in the plaintiff’s position.45 The implicated
discrimination includes all the Title VII categories—race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin46—as well as age discrimination pursuant to the ADEA47 and

38. When Congress added § 717 to Title VII, it had both a substantive and a procedural
aspect. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 717, 86 Stat. 103,
111–12 (codified as amended at Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 11, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(2000)). Section 717(a) provides a general ban on discrimination in federal employment, while
§ 717(b) imposes special procedures that apply in those federal employment claims. Id. Section
633a of the ADEA does not include those special procedures. Instead, it simply requires the
claimant to file with the EEOC, as is required in the private sector. See 29 U.S.C. § 633a(b).
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a).
40. Id.
41. Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1936 (2008).
42. Id. at 1935. Chief Justice Roberts, joined in part by Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.
Id. at 1943 (Roberts, C.J., joined in part by Scalia, J. and Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
joined Justice Thomas’s separate dissent. Id. at 1951 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting).
43. Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006).
44. Id. at 69–70.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 56 (explaining that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 11, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (2000) forbids an employer from discriminating against an employee because that
employee opposed discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
47. See Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1936 (holding that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (2006), prohibits retaliation against an employee
who files a complaint for age discrimination).
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race discrimination in contracting pursuant to § 1981.48 The employees protected
from retaliation include private sector employees, employees of state and local
government and, at least as to age discrimination, federal sector employees.49
III. ANALYSIS OF THE AUTHORING J USTICES’ APPROACHES
A. Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer authored the decisions in Burlington50 and CBOCS West.51 A
former administrative law teacher, Justice Breyer advocates a method of
statutory interpretation aimed at determining the purpose of the legislation,
which is fundamentally a pragmatic approach.52 If the preliminary examination
of the statute’s language, structure, and history does not easily determine the
answer to the question of interpretation, then he thinks there is a divide in
judicial approach.53 While Justice Scalia is an example of a judge who looks
primarily to the text, the structure of the text, and canons of interpretation,54
others, including Justice Breyer, “look primarily to the statute’s purposes for
enlightenment. They avoid the use of interpretive canons . . . . [and t]hey speak
in terms of congressional ‘intent’ . . . [as] the intent of the group . . . .”55 To

48. See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2008) (“[T]hat § 1981
encompasses retaliation claims is indeed well embedded in the law.”).
49. See Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1936 (discussing types of employees who have standing
to file complaints for retaliation). See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 8–11, Gomez-Perez, 128
S. Ct. 1931 (No. 06-1321), for a discussion of whether § 717(a) of Title VII protects employees
against retaliation.
50. See Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 56 (2006).
51. See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1954.
52. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY : INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 85 (2005). He explains his approach to statutory interpretation by stating a general
proposition:
Most judges start in the same way. They look first to the statute’s language, its structure,
and its history in an effort to determine the statute’s purpose. They then use that purpose
(along with the language, structure, and history) to determine the proper interpretation.
Id. at 86. While calling himself a “constrained” pragmatist, Judge Posner characterizes Justice
Breyer as a “quasi-pragmatist.” See POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 3, at 253–54. Judge
Posner says at one point that Justice Breyer is “regarded as the most pragmatic member of the
current Supreme Court.” Id. at 320. Nevertheless, Judge Posner is very critical of the approach
Justice Breyer articulates in his book. Id. at 104.
53. BREYER, supra note 52, at 86.
54. See id. at 86–87 & n.2 (citing Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION : FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 26–27 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997)). Judge Posner characterizes Justice Scalia as a legalist or formalist but says “there are no
consistent legalists.” See POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 3, at 48.
55. BREYER, supra note 52, at 87. Judge Posner criticizes Justice Breyer’s focus on
legislative purpose as tending to “override legislative compromises,” thereby giving supporters of
the legislation “more than they were able to achieve in the legislative process.” POSNER, HOW
JUDGES THINK, supra note 3, at 336.
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illustrate this, Justice Breyer creates a hypothetical “reasonable member of
Congress.”56 An important difference between the two approaches concerns the
use of legislative history. While textualists disfavor the use of legislative history
because they consider it inherently unreliable, those who follow Justice Breyer’s
approach think that legislative history can help determine the legislative purpose
by constructing what a hypothetical reasonable member of Congress would
determine as the law’s purpose.57 Justice Breyer eschews judges adopting their
own social or political views of a law’s purpose but finds that his legislative
purpose approach properly limits the role of judges: “[A]n interpretation of a
statute that tends to implement the legislator’s will helps to implement the
public’s will and is therefore consistent with the Constitution’s democratic
purpose.” 58
Given what he claims to be his general approach to statutory interpretation,59
Justice Breyer offered few surprises in Burlington. The question presented was
whether the prohibition on retaliation in § 704(a) was limited to retaliatory
actions taken by the employer affecting the terms and conditions of employment
or whether retaliation protection reached beyond the employer’s workplace.60
Justice Breyer began his analysis with the text.61 He pinpointed the textual
similarities and the differences between the substantive prohibition of
discrimination62 in § 703(a) and in the proscription of retaliation in § 704(a).63
Because both statutes use the term “discriminate,” the employer asserted that the
Court should read the antiretaliation provision in pari materia with the
antidiscrimination provision.64 Thus, the argument was that the words of
limitation in § 703(a) should be read into § 704(a) to limit § 704(a)’s scope to
employment related matters, such as hiring or firing.65 Justice Breyer did not

56. BREYER, supra note 52, at 88.
57. Id. at 87–88.
58. Id. at 99. He concedes, however, that if the approach of Justice Scalia were adopted and
applied consistently throughout the legislative process and the judicial interpretation of the product
of that process, then textualism might be appropriate. Id. However, “in the world as it is, we shall do
better to use whatever tools best identify congressional purpose in the circumstances.” Id. In
contrast, Justice Scalia thinks that an even narrower textualist approach is necessary in order to limit
the risk that judges will substitute their ideas of what is good for those of Congress. See Scalia,
supra note 54, at 19–28.
59. See BREYER, supra note 52, at 98.
60. See Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 56–57 (2006).
61. See id. at 59–60.
62. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
63. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 61–62.
64. Id. at 61. The term in pari materia means upon the same matter or subject. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed. 2004); see generally 3A SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION,
NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 73.11, at 837 (6th ed. 2003)
[hereinafter SUTHERLAND] (noting that courts should construe in pari materia statutes together to
“produce a harmonious statutory scheme”). A more appropriate canon might be noscitur a sociis:
“[T]he meaning of an unclear word or phrase should be determined by the words immediately
surrounding it.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1087 (8th ed. 2004).
65. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 73–75 (Alito, J., concurring).
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reject the in pari material canon of construction but instead distinguished it as
not applying in this case. While both sections include the term “discriminate,”
the context of that use differs significantly:
The . . . words in the substantive provision—‘hire,’ ‘discharge,’
‘compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,’
‘employment opportunities,’ and ‘status as an employee’—explicitly
limit the scope of that provision to actions that affect employment or
alter the conditions of the workplace. No such limiting words appear in
the antiretaliation provision.66
Justice Breyer looked to the legislative purposes of each section in determining
that § 704(a) is not limited to employer actions involving the workplace.67
Because the purpose of § 703(a)’s ban on discrimination is to ensure that the
workplace is free of discrimination, that section focuses on the workplace to
protect workers from discrimination because of their racial, ethnic, or genderbased status.68 In contrast, § 704(a)’s purpose is to prevent employer conduct
that interferes with full enforcement of the substantive provisions.69 Thus,
§ 704(a) seeks to “prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their
conduct.”70 If employers could successfully retaliate against workers “by taking
actions not directly related” to the workplace, they could frustrate the purpose of
§ 704(a).71
Finding that the Court could only serve Congressional purpose by extending
the protection of § 704(a) to employer actions outside of the workplace, Justice
Breyer then addressed the severity of harm a plaintiff need suffer in order to
challenge that harm as retaliation.72 It is here that Justice Breyer showed his
pragmatism.73 Rather than construing § 704(a) to ban all retaliation, he created a
test—not based on the terms of the statute—to define the severity of the
employer’s action that insulates some retaliatory behavior by employers.74 If a

66. Id. at 62.
67. Id. at 63. By looking at the consequences a particular approach will have on the overall
functioning of this legislation, Justice Breyer may be edging toward a liberal position on statutory
interpretation.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Id. (second emphasis added). In Gomez-Perez, the Court examined the notion that under
the ADEA, discrimination deals with status while retaliation focuses on conduct. Gomez-Perez v.
Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1937 (2008).
71. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 63.
72. Id. at 67–70.
73. A liberal approach would go further by finding that failing to reach all retaliatory actions,
even those beyond employment actions, would frustrate § 703(a)’s ban on discrimination. That is
because allowing some retaliatory actions to go unchecked would insulate some discrimination from
attack. Leaving some retaliation beyond the reach of the law gives employers an incentive to use
those retaliatory actions to shelter some discrimination.
74. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68–69.
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court determines that the employer’s retaliatory actions would not deter a
reasonable employee from protesting discrimination, then the employer is not
liable even though it did in fact retaliate.75 To be prohibited, a plaintiff must
show that the employer’s action was significant enough to deter a reasonable
employee from protesting the employer’s discrimination even though the
plaintiff complained of it. Justice Breyer noted that lower courts had taken four
different approaches76 and indicated that § 704(a) “protects an individual not
from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or harm.”77 As if
choosing from a menu that he assumed included all the possible choices, Justice
Breyer picked the formulation that the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits
had adopted: “In our view, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee
would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context
means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.”78
In picking a middle ground from among decisions by lower courts, Justice
Breyer failed to look at the Court’s own earlier precedent as to Congress’s
purpose in enacting Title VII. For example, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,79 the Court found that “Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle

75. Id. at 69–70. On one hand, insulating some retaliatory action from liability allows an
employer who wants to retaliate to do so without incurring liability by taking small, irritating
actions designed to punish the employee for having complained of discrimination but not rising to
the level of causing a materially adverse effect. On the other hand, it may be unreasonable to expect
a court to provide remedy for every employee who claims he is a victim of retaliation despite the
employer’s action being of no real consequence.
76. Id. at 60–61. Justice Breyer explained,
Some Circuits have insisted upon a close relationship between the retaliatory action
and employment. The Sixth Circuit majority in this case, for example, said that a plaintiff
must show an “adverse employment action,” which it defined as a “materially adverse
change in the terms and conditions” of employment. The Sixth Circuit has thus joined
those Courts of Appeals that apply the same standard for retaliation that they apply to a
substantive discrimination offense, holding that the challenged action must “resul[t] in an
adverse effect on the ‘terms, conditions, or benefits’ of employment.” The Fifth and the
Eighth Circuits have adopted a more restrictive approach. They employ an “ultimate
employment decisio[n]” standard, which limits actionable retaliatory conduct to acts
“‘such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating.’”
Other Circuits have not so limited the scope of the provision. The Seventh and the
District of Columbia Circuits have said that the plaintiff must show that the “employer’s
challenged action would have been material to a reasonable employee,” which in contexts
like the present one means that it would likely have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” And the Ninth Circuit, following
EEOC guidance, has said that the plaintiff must simply establish “‘adverse treatment that
is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or
others from engaging in protected activity.’”
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 67.
78. Id. at 68 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
79. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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or otherwise.”80 Evoking McDonnell Douglas would be to look to an era when
the Court adopted a pro-employee posture in interpreting Title VII.81 The
Burlington Court’s failure to protect all employment-related actions simply
because a court might find the consequences of the retaliatory action on the
employee to be trivial82 partially undermines a broad purpose of Title VII. From
the perspective of a broad approach to statutory purpose, Title VII’s language
dealing with “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”83 merely limits the
scope of application of Title VII to employment and not to other types of
relationships, such as a customer and client relationship and situations covered
by the other Titles of the 1964 Act.84 If a broad purpose is appropriate, then
courts should not use this test as a barrier to actions claiming an employer has
discriminated.
While the materiality test the Court adopted may “separate significant from
trivial harms,” 85 the pragmatic approach of Justice Breyer avoids the deeper
question of interpretation of whether plaintiffs should be able to challenge all
retaliatory actions involving employment. The effect of treating the language
about terms and conditions of employment simply as a boundary between
employment and other relationships would appear to give employees the
discretion to challenge all retaliatory actions, be they slight or not, on the job or
off.86 Take, for example, an employer that assigned women who complained of

80. Id. at 801.
81. See, e.g., Rachel K. Alexander, Taking the Detour Around Defending Protected Activity:
How Burlington Northern & Sante Fe Railway Co. v. White Unnecessarily Complicates Litigation
of Retaliation Claims, 27 REV. LITIG. 333, 335, 337–41 (2008) (discussing the heightened burdens
imposed on employees under Title VII since the 1970s).
82. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68.
83. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
84. See Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1151
(1998). The other Titles that make up the Civil Rights Act of 1964 all focus on discrimination, but
each addresses different situations in which discrimination arises. See Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 241–68 (1964) (Title I (Voting Rights), Title II (Injunctive Relief
Against Discrimination in Places of Public Accommodation), Title III (Desegregation of Public
Facilities), Title IV (Desegregation of Public Education), Title V (Commission on Civil Rights),
Title VI (Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs), Title VII (Equal Employment
Opportunity), Title VIII (Registration and Voting Statistics), Title IX (Intervention and Procedure
After Removal in Civil Rights Cases), and Title X (Establishment of Community Relations
Service)). Thus, the Act establishes boundaries to distinguish the scope of application of each of the
Titles.
85. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68. The issue of how adverse an action must be also arises in
basic discrimination claims as well as retaliation actions. Since Burlington, there is a movement to
adopt a related materiality test to determine whether a plaintiff’s complaint of discrimination is
trivial. See Minor v. Centocor, Inc., 457 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 2006).
86. The Burlington materiality test is not well-suited to deal with the fear that floodgates of
litigation have opened. It is likely that the test has had little effect on the number of lawsuits
actually filed. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a
Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 907 (2008) (noting that while scholars initially
construed Burlington as pro-plaintiff, the subsequent lawsuits filed show a potentially opposite
trend). The test is so case-specific that no one knows ex ante what will be found material until the
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discrimination to Dilbert cubicles painted pink while assigning men who
complained of discrimination to blue cubicles. Some would argue the color of
cubicles is trivial since it does not immediately impinge on anyone’s job in the
sense of loss of income or a promotion. Others would argue that the color
scheme created a discriminatory atmosphere that incorporated sex stereotypes
into the workplace, which would be a disincentive to any reasonable person who
might complain of discrimination. In such a situation, a court’s finding that the
plaintiff’s complaint raised an issue that was too trivial seems problematic
because some discrimination would be sheltered from challenge because of the
threat of being stigmatized for protesting it. Not only the original, broad
interpretation but also a literal interpretation of Title VII would reach such
obviously retaliatory action taken in response to a complaint of discrimination.
The pragmatic approach of Justice Breyer and the Court in Burlington tolerates
some retaliation.87 A more fully developed, but nevertheless pragmatic, approach
might find the costs of intrusion into an employer’s workplace to redress
retaliation outweighed by a social policy that values eliminating as much
discrimination as possible.
In CBOCS West, Justice Breyer’s opinion relied primarily on precedent88
and found insufficient the arguments the employer advanced against applying
that precedent.89 Justice Breyer first looked to Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc.,90 which held that § 1982, the companion provision to § 1981 which protects

court finds that a particular action is or is not. So, if these claims will mostly result in lawsuits, there
seems little reason to put the parties and the court through all the effort and expense to get the case
to summary judgment only to have the court tell the plaintiff his complaint is too trivial to justify it
being resolved on the merits. It may not take that much more judicial resources to simply decide
whether the complained of actions were discriminatory.
87. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68. See also Brake & Grossman, supra note 86, at 907–11,
for a description of how courts have misapplied Burlington, particularly some of the nullification
courts. But see Lidge, supra note 6, at 521–25, for analysis showing that Burlington can be
interpreted to be more protective than some of the lower court authority that the Court referred to
favorably.
88. CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1955–58 (2008). While downplaying
the necessity of following precedent, Judge Posner does think precedent is significant: “Although
precedents can be distinguished and even overruled, they have some authority, which means that
there is a cost to circumventing or eliminating a precedent.” POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra
note 3, at 39. For contrast, see Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of
Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 319–27 (2005), for a good description of how the Supreme
Court views statutory precedent as a strong form of stare decisis. See also Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 647, 656–71 (1992), for an argument that the canons of statutory interpretation can be
meaningful. For a discussion of logical indeterminacy arising from judicial discretion in choosing
among several precedents in the context of English law, see generally Julius Stone, Fallacies of the
Logical Form in English Law: A Study of Stare Decisis in Legal Flux, in 2 The Philosophy of Legal
Reasoning: Precedents, Statutes, and Analysis of Legal Concepts 300, 300–40 (Scott Brewer ed.,
1998).
89. CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1958–61.
90. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
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rights related to ownership of property, also protects against retaliation.91 In that
case, Sullivan, a white man, had rented a house to Freeman, a black man.92 The
house was in an area that gave owners and lessees the right to own shares in a
corporation that operated a playground open only to shareholders.93 Because of
Freeman’s race, the corporation applied its explicit policy limiting ownership to
whites and refused to accept Freeman’s application.94 The corporation then
retaliated against Sullivan by expelling him from the corporation, thereby
depriving him of the use of the playground.95 In Sullivan, the Court upheld both
plaintiffs’ claims. Freeman, who had left the area, could maintain his § 1981
action for damages because the corporation’s refusal to approve the transfer of
shares in the corporation denied his right to lease property because of his race.96
And Sullivan, the lessor, had his own § 1982 claim for injunctive relief to
recover his shares in the corporation so he could continue to use the
playground.97
In his dissent in CBOS West, Justice Thomas stated that Sullivan was only a
third-party standing decision and not one involving direct protection against
retaliation.98 Justice Breyer, on the other hand, did not elaborate on Sullivan but
instead quoted the more recent decision of the Rehnquist Court in Jackson v.
Birmingham Board of Education,99 which made clear that Sullivan interpreted
§ 1982 to encompass retaliation claims.100 Justice Breyer then cited precedent
from the Burger Court era in which the Court interpreted § 1981 consistently
with § 1982.101 Justice Breyer concluded that, given the ‘“sister statutes’

91. Id. at 237.
92. See id. at 234–35.
93. Id. at 234.
94. Id. at 235.
95. Id. (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1952)).
96. Id. at 237.
97. Id.
98. See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1965 (2008) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“Having reexamined Sullivan, I remain convinced that it was a third-party standing
case.”). Justice Thomas’s view is mistaken because the Court in Sullivan upheld the damages claim
of Freeman, the black plaintiff, as well as Sullivan’s claim for injunctive relief, see Sullivan, 396
U.S. at 235, in which Sullivan presumably sought reinstatement as a shareholder in the corporation
because he still lived in the area and, presumably, valued access to the playground and park
facilities that were available only to shareholders, see id. at 234–35. However, the Sullivan Court
did indicate that Sullivan had “standing” to bring the action and did not use the term “retaliate.” See
id. at 237. But there is no indication that he was claiming standing to represent the interests of
Freeman, a party to the action who was asserting his own claims. The language apparently means
that Sullivan’s claim for retaliation is within the scope of the protections provided by the statute and
thus he could bring his own action.
99. 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
100. CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1955 (citing Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176).
101. Id. at 1955 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 173 (1976)).
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common language, origin, and purposes,” 102 the antiretaliation precedent from
§ 1981 applied to § 1982.103
Justice Breyer next turned to evaluate the consequences of the Rehnquist
Court’s near nullification of § 1981 in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union104 and
the response to that decision by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.105
While not dealing directly with retaliation claims, the Patterson Court read the
statute narrowly so as not to apply to “conduct by the employer after the contract
relation has been established.”106 Recognizing that retaliation typically takes
place after contract formation, Justice Breyer indicated that Patterson, “for a
brief time, seems in practice to have foreclosed retaliation claims.”107 The
response by Congress was to supersede Patterson by adding new subsection (b),
which defined the term “make and enforce contracts” to include “performance,
modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.”108 The
legislative history of the 1991 Act also made it clear that Congress intended
§ 1981 to encompass retaliation claims.109 Justice Breyer explained the effect of
the Congressional override of Patterson: “[G]iven Sullivan and the new statutory
language nullifying Patterson, there was no need for Congress to include explicit
language about retaliation. After all, the 1991 amendments themselves make
clear that Congress intended to supersede the result in Patterson and embrace
pre-Patterson law. And pre-Patterson law included Sullivan.”110

102. Id. at 1956.
103. Id. at 1958. Race discrimination in contracting and in property transactions seems quite
similar because both types played a significant part in the racially discriminatory superstructure of
the Jim Crow era.
104. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
105. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
2 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
106. CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1956 (quoting Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177).
107. Id. Justice Breyer cites lower court authority to this effect. Id. at 1957.
108. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071–72 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2000)).
109. E.g., H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I), at 92–93 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 630
(noting that Congress intended to include retaliation claims in the protections provided by
subsection (b)).
110. CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1959. See generally Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents
and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 511 (2009). Professor Widiss’s article examines the way courts apply statutory
provisions after Congress enacts amendments to overturn or override court decisions interpreting
the original statutes. Id. at 512. While she finds that courts do not continue to apply the overturned
precedent to cases on all fours, they sometimes still apply the underlying rationales of the
superseded decisions in other fact situations brought under the amended, as well as related, statutes.
Id. She proposes a rule of construction or interpretive canon that creates a rebuttable presumption
that the override supersedes the judicial interpretation and the rationale for that interpretation of the
preexisting statutory language. Id. That leaves the statute ready for a “fresh” interpretation, free of
the earlier decision and its rationale. Id.
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Based on this rather straightforward analysis of the text and precedent,
Justice Breyer concluded that the “view that § 1981 encompasses retaliation
claims is indeed well embedded in the law” so that “considerations of stare
decisis strongly support our adherence to that view.”111 The employer’s
arguments did not overcome the “considerations of stare decisis.”112 In
responding to the main thrust of the employer’s textual argument, that because
the term “retaliation” does not appear in § 1981 the statute does not prohibit
retaliation, Justice Breyer adopted the approach that Justice O’Connor had used
in Jackson. Just as Justice O’Connor found that the Congress that enacted Title
IX “was thoroughly familiar”113 with the interpretation the Court had made
several years earlier in Sullivan, Justice Breyer found that Congress had to be
aware of Sullivan when it amended § 1981 in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
overturning Patterson.114 This approach suggests the emergence of a canon of
statutory construction that presumes Congress intended to use the Court’s
determination of the meaning of a term, at least if the congressional action is
reasonably contemporaneous with the earlier Court decision.115
In sum, Justice Breyer did not discuss his theories of judicial decision
making or statutory interpretation in either Burlington or in CBOCS West.
Nevertheless, he used interpretative techniques such as reliance on the text of the
statute, consideration of statutory structure, and examination of legislative
history, which are consistent with his theoretical approach. He distinguished,
rather than disavowed, the in pari materia canon of statutory interpretation.
Relying on a view of legislative purpose, he rejected a textual argument that the
limitations to employment found in § 703(a) be read into § 704(a). His approach

111. CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1958.
112. Id. The employer in CBOCS West made four arguments. First, it argued that because the
statute did not include the term “retaliation,” the retaliation was not within the scope of the statute’s
protection. Id. The Court rejected this argument based on Sullivan and Jackson. Id. at 1958–59.
Second, the employer argued that because the amendments to § 1981 in the Civil Rights Act of
1991 did not include the term “retaliation,” the statute did not proscribe retaliation. Id. at 1959. The
Court rejected this argument because Congress had no need to include it, given the Court’s holding
in Sullivan. Id. Third, the employer argued that providing for protection against retaliation in § 1981
created statutory overlap because of the express antiretaliation provision of Title VII. Id. The Court
found that this argument proved too much, since Congress intended that the two statutes in general
did provide some overlapping protection against race discrimination. Id. at 1960. Finally, the
employer argued that, based on Burlington, a Title VII case, § 1981 protects only actions taken
because of the status of a person based on race and not those taken based on the person’s conduct.
Id. The Court rejected this argument because it found the antiretaliation provision of Title VII to
have a broader reach, including actions outside of employment, while the statute’s discrimination
provisions were specifically limited to various employment-related decisions and practices. Id. Any
distinction between status and conduct did not mean that § 1981 did not proscribe retaliation.
113. Id. at 1959 (quoting Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 176 (2005)).
114. Id.
115. Thus, this may be a new area for the application of a “clear statement” rule. Unless
Congress separately defines a term in a way that makes clear it is not adopting a definition of that
term decided upon by the Court, a reviewing court will read the term in the new statute as having
adopted the Court’s definition.
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was not a liberal one, at least when compared with the interpretations of Title
VII in its early years, because the materiality test adopted in Burlington allows
some clearly retaliatory actions by an employer to sneak under the radar if a
court finds that the employer’s conduct would not deter a reasonable employee
from complaining of discrimination. His approach was pragmatic because the
test he adopted in Burlington for the severity of retaliatory action necessary to
make it actionable is not textual, but it instead looks to the legislative purpose
and to the different functions the antidiscrimination and the antiretaliation
provisions serve. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of his approach in
Burlington is his ratification of Justice O’Connor’s analysis that binds Congress
to the meaning of a statutory term as determined by the Court in a reasonably
contemporaneous construction of the term in another statute.116
B. Justice Alito
Justice Alito wrote an opinion in Burlington,117 concurring in the judgment
but declining to join the opinion of the Court.118 He did not expand the scope of
retaliation protection to employer actions that reach beyond the workplace.119
Alito began by focusing on the text of § 704(a), which makes it unlawful for an
employer “to discriminate . . . because [an employee] has opposed any practice
made . . . unlawful . . . or because he has made a charge.”120 Based on his reading
of the text, Alito saw two possible interpretations of the term “discriminate.”121
The plaintiff had argued that the term “discriminate” in the statute means “to
treat differently,” an interpretation that would require an employer to treat
employees who make discrimination complaints the same as employees who
never complained.122 In other words, the plaintiff had proposed an equal
treatment test to determine the viability of a retaliation claim. Justice Alito
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the retaliation provision reaches any and
every action taken by the employer as a result of a worker’s complaint of
discrimination.123

116. To the extent that this approach is actually a rule or canon of statutory construction, it
would reflect, at least as Judge Posner frames it, a more formalist approach. See supra notes 52–55
and accompanying text. This seems to be out of line with the approach Justice Breyer takes towards
the canons. See BREYER, supra note 52, at 86–87.
117. Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 73 (2006) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
118. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 73 (Alito, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 76–77.
120. Id. at 74 (quoting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(a) (2000)).
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 74–75.
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Given the jurisprudence limiting the type of actions that plaintiffs can
challenge as discriminatory,124 the plaintiff’s proposed meaning would leave
plaintiffs less protected from discrimination than they would be from retaliation
for having complained of that discrimination.125 This would be so because only
adverse employment actions can be challenged as discriminatory while,
presumably, any action taken as retaliation, no matter how trivial, would be
subject to challenge as retaliation.126 Justice Alito described what the plaintiff’s
equal treatment test would mean:
[A] retaliation claim must go to the jury if the employee creates a
genuine issue on such questions as whether the employee was given any
more or less work than others, was subjected to any more or less
supervision, or was treated in a somewhat less friendly manner because
of his protected activity.127
A liberal approach would have looked at the difference Justice Alito
articulated but would have gone the other way, concluding that the reach of the
antidiscrimination provision should include all discriminatory employment
actions. In contrast, Justice Alito took a narrow approach, assuming that
Congress did not intend to burden courts with claims of discrimination based on
such “relatively trivial differences in treatment.”128
Because he limited himself to a text-based argument, Justice Alito
determined that the only plausible alternative was to link the term “discriminate”
in § 704(a) to its use in § 703(a) so that only discrimination “with respect
to . . . compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” would be
within the scope of employer actions that a plaintiff could challenge in a
retaliation claim, just as plaintiffs could challenge only actions within those
terms as discrimination under § 703(a).129 Acknowledging that this was not “the

124. See White, supra note 84, at 1135.
125. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 74 (Alito, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 75.
127. Id. That position assumes, of course, that the lower court’s narrowing construction of
§ 703(a) is correct. A better interpretation of the language of § 703(a) is that it only creates a
boundary between actions arising out of employment and not out of some other relationship
between the parties. See White, supra note 84. If § 703(a) could be interpreted according to its plain
meaning, then so could § 704(a).
128. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 75 (Alito, J., concurring).
129. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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most straightforward reading of the bare language of § 704(a),”130 Justice Alito
nevertheless thought his approach better than the one adopted by the majority.131
In contrast to Justice Breyer’s more purpose-directed approach in
Burlington, Justice Alito claimed to tie his opinion more closely to the text by
keying his approach to the definition of the term “discriminate,”132 even though
he rejected the most straightforward textual argument.133 But he left the text
behind by reading the other terms of § 703(a) into § 704(a), where they do not
appear.134 With that move, he rejected the more straightforward textual argument
that any violation of equal treatment by the employer is retaliation encompassed
by the statute.135
Based on his concurrence in Burlington, it is hard to characterize Justice
Alito’s style of decision making other than to say that he proceeds cautiously,
possibly pragmatically. He stated, but rejected, one text-based interpretation,136
which suggests he is not a formalist. His next move was to read some of the text
from one statutory provision into another, thus presenting a narrower
interpretation of that statute than the one adopted by the majority.137 To reject a
plain meaning argument because of the concern that adopting such an argument
would extend the application of the statute too broadly obviously is taking into

130. Id. A straightforward textual argument would not read the text from § 703(a)’s
antidiscrimination provision into the antiretaliation provisions of § 704(a). A textualist would
interpret the absence of more specific language in § 704(a) to mean that those terms do not limit
retaliation claims in § 703(a).
131. Id. at 76–79. Justice Alito wrote that the majority’s test, which reaches retaliatory
conduct beyond the workplace, “is misplaced” for several reasons. Id. at 76. First, most retaliatory
conduct likely occurs “on the job.” Id. That may be so, but Justice Alito’s interpretation would
create an incentive for employers to retaliate outside the workplace. Second, his interpretation
would reach some off-the-job retaliatory conduct because the conduct would involve a term or
condition of employment. Id. at 76–77. Third, the majority approach “has no grounding in the
statutory language.” Id. at 77. Fourth, the majority test “leads logically to perverse results” because
it would require taking into account the nature or type of the discrimination that led to the filing of
the retaliation charge. Id. at 77–78. Thus, a discharged employee would have less protection from
retaliation because few retaliatory actions by the employer would be so severe that it would
dissuade the employee from filing a discrimination charge challenging the ultimate action of
discharge. Id. at 78. Fifth, the majority’s conception of “a reasonable worker” is unclear because, by
taking into account the individualized situation of the plaintiff, the test seems to implicate a
subjective standard. Id. at 78–79. Finally, the causation standard—whether a retaliatory act “well
might have dissuaded” an employee from filing discrimination charges—is “loose and unfamiliar.”
Id. at 79.
132. See id. at 75, 77.
133. See id. at 74–75.
134. See id. at 75.
135. See id. at 75–77. His approach fails to address the structural differences between § 703(a)
and § 704(a) that formed the basis of the employer’s argument in Gomez-Perez. Namely, the
general ban on age discrimination did not protect federal sector employees from retaliation because
there was no express ban on retaliation. See Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1939–41
(2008).
136. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
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account the future consequences of the decision being made. This can be seen as
reflecting pragmatic thinking.
Writing for the Court in Gomez-Perez, Justice Alito followed the approach
used by Justice Breyer in CBOCS West. He started with Sullivan as precedent, as
did Justice Breyer, but then he quickly moved to discuss the more directly
relevant authority of Jackson, the Title IX retaliation case.138 Congress drafted
the statutory structure of Title IX, which prohibits discrimination based on
gender in federally funded education programs, including athletic programs,
using a general proscription of discrimination.139 This structure is quite similar to
the protection against age discrimination provided to federal employees by
§ 633a(a) of the ADEA,140 as well as § 717 of Title VII,141 which also applies to
federal employees.
In Jackson, the Court had held a male sports coach at a high school to be
protected against retaliation by his employer after the coach protested
discrimination against the girls’ basketball program at his school.142 Title IX
provides that “[n]o person . . . shall, on the basis of sex . . . be subjected to
discrimination under any education program.” 143 Thus, as with § 633a(a) of the
ADEA, Title IX sets forth a general ban on discrimination, which made reliance
on Title IX precedent particularly useful in analyzing § 633a(a). The GomezPerez Court found that “[t]he statutory language at issue here (‘discrimination
based on age’) is not materially different from the language at issue in Jackson
(‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex’) and is the functional equivalent of the
language at issue in Sullivan.”144
Taking an approach that looked to legislative purpose, Justice Alito quoted
at length from Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Jackson, explaining that when a
statute adopts a general ban on discrimination, retaliation is among the kinds of
activities proscribed.145 Just as an employer subjects a victim of discrimination to
unequal treatment, an employer has intentionally subjected a victim of retaliation

138. Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1936–37 (citing Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544
U.S. 167, 171, 173–74, 177, 184–85 (2005)).
139. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat.
235, 373–75 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006)).
140. See Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1936–37 (citing the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (2006)).
141. See id. at 1940 (citing Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 717,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
142. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171.
143. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006).
144. Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1937.
145. Id. at 1936–37 (quoting Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173–74) (“Retaliation against a person
because that person has complained of sex discrimination is another form of intentional sex
discrimination. . . . Retaliation is, by definition, an intentional act. It is a form of ‘discrimination’
because the complainant is being subjected to differential treatment. Moreover, retaliation is
discrimination ‘on the basis of sex’ because it is an intentional response to the nature of the
complaint: an allegation of sex discrimination.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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to unequal treatment in the sense that the employer would not have taken the
action it did but for the victim having complained of discrimination.146 Based on
the similarity between discrimination and retaliation, Justice Alito concluded,
“Following the reasoning of Sullivan and Jackson, we interpret the ADEA
federal-sector provision’s prohibition of ‘discrimination based on age’ as
likewise proscribing retaliation.”147 Justice Alito rejected the lower court’s
attempt to distinguish the two statutory provisions by distinguishing Jackson.148
Justice Alito rejected the government’s textual argument that the ADEA
does not prohibit retaliation because, while Congress expressly included it in the
provisions applying to private sector employment, Congress did not expressly
include it as to federal sector employment.149 The two statutory schemes differ
fundamentally. The federal ban is a general proscription while the private sector
proscription sets out a specific list of forbidden employer practices.150 That
difference in structure flowed from the fact that the federal sector ban on age
discrimination channeled the similar ban on federal sector discrimination that
Congress had earlier added to Title VII, again after Congress had adopted the
more narrowly focused proscriptions for private employers.151

146. Id.
147. Id. at 1937.
148. Id. at 1938. The lower court distinguished Jackson in three ways, but the Supreme Court
rejected all three. First, the lower court assumed that because the courts had implied a private cause
of action under Title IX but Congress had expressly created a private cause of action under the
ADEA, the Jackson Court had greater leeway to use an expansive interpretation of Title IX. See id.
The Court rejected this analysis as perverse, because it would mean that a provision creating a
private cause of action would justify a court in limiting the scope of protection more narrowly than
in a court created, implied cause of action. See id. Second, the lower court opined that retaliation
claims play a more important role in Title IX than in the ADEA. See id. The Court rejected this
distinction, reasoning that this fails to understand that the Court based its decision in Jackson on the
interpretation of the text, not on policy grounds. See id. at 1939 (quoting Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173,
178). Finally, the lower court stated that Congress adopted Title IX in response to Sullivan, but
there was no similar context concerning the ADEA federal sector protections. Id. The Court
concluded that there was “no reason to think that Congress forgot about Sullivan during the two
years that passed between the enactment of Title IX in 1972 and the enactment of § 633a in 1974.”
Id. This final argument asserted by the Court again reflects what may be an emerging canon of
interpretation under which courts hold Congress to the Court’s contemporaneous construction of a
statutory term unless Congress expressly defines that term.
149. Id. at 1939–41.
150. Id. at 1940.
151. See id. at 1940–41. In the oral argument, there was sharp colloquy about whether the
Title VII ban on discrimination in the federal sector included within it a ban on retaliation. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, 10–11, Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. 1931 (No. 06-1321). It is clear
that in amending the ADEA to make it applicable to federal employees, Congress used the same
model it had used when it extended Title VII to federal employees. See Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at
1939–40 (citing Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 167 n.15 (1981)). However, there is nothing in
the legislative history of § 717(a) indicating why Congress took the approach it did with respect to
Title VII in the first instance. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 22–26 (1971), reprinted in SUBCOMM.
ON LABOR, S. COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 82–86 (1972). Presumably, the reason Congress used
a separate, general proscription of all discrimination in § 717(a) is because the exercise of those
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The government also argued that Congress did not intend for the federal
sector age discrimination ban to include a prohibition on retaliation because
Congress expected that the Civil Service Commission would revise its
regulations to ban retaliation based on age, just as the Commission had banned
discrimination (including retaliation) in regulations enacted after Congress
extended Title VII to the federal sector.152 Justice Alito rejected this argument as
inherently contradictory, calling it speculative because there was no evidence in
the text, structure, or legislative history that Congress had in fact relied on the
Civil Service Commission to fill the gap.153 On one hand, if Congress did not
intend § 633a(a) to include retaliation within its proscriptions, there would be no
reason for Congress to expect the Civil Service Commission to ban it by
regulation.154 On the other hand, if Congress had specifically declined to ban
retaliation, then the Civil Service Commission would be acting ultra vires if it
did undertake to ban retaliation.155 Because precedent supported including
retaliation within the proscription of age discrimination in the ADEA provision
that applied to federal sector employment, and because the arguments for
distinguishing that authority were quite weak, Justice Alito concluded that
§ 633a(a) protects an employee from retaliation when an employee of the federal
government has complained of age discrimination.156
Looking only at the retaliation opinions of Justice Alito in Burlington and
Gomez-Perez, his approach to statutory construction appears to be cautious but
with at least an overtone of pragmatism. Like Justice Breyer in Burlington,157 he
was unwilling to proscribe all employer actions that amounted to retaliation. But
he also took one further, narrowing step by exempting from the proscription all
retaliatory actions outside of employment.158 A more committed pragmatist

claims by federal employees was subject to the specialized procedural requirement added in
§ 717(b). See supra note 38. Congress followed the structure it had used in Title VII when it
extended the ADEA to federal employees, see Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1940 (citing Lehman, 453
U.S. at 167 n.15), even though it did not attach special procedural requirements to federal employee
claims of discrimination, see Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 633a
(2006).
152. Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1941–42.
153. Id. at 1942.
154. Id.
155. See id. At a general level, the civil service system is designed to select qualified
employees and then to provide job security to covered employees. In the civil service system,
neither discrimination nor retaliation for having challenged discrimination justify an employer
taking an adverse action against an employee. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 22–23 (1971), reprinted
in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, S. COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 82–83 (1972). Thus, in some sense, civil
service law proscribed discrimination and retaliation without need for any legislation by Congress.
But Congress nevertheless extended Title VII protections to all federal workers, even those covered
by civil service, because it found that the civil service system had failed to be an adequate system to
protect federal employees from discrimination. See id. at 23–24.
156. Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1943.
157. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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would have understood that a consequence of limiting retaliation protection to
the employer’s workplace would give employers the opportunity to retaliate in a
calculated way by making sure the retaliatory actions occurred beyond the
workplace.159 In Gomez-Perez, Justice Alito channeled Justice Breyer’s approach
in his two retaliation opinions by looking to precedent and to Justice O’Connor’s
approach in Jackson of relying on the purpose of Congress in creating different
approaches to private and public sector employees. It might even be argued that
he moved slightly to a more pro-employee position in Gomez-Perez from where
he started in his Burlington concurrence. A more fully committed pragmatist,
however, might have bolstered the decision to include retaliation within a
general proscription of discrimination by exploring the consequences of failing
to do so. Basically, the proscription of discrimination would be much
diminished, if not completely undermined, if the provision did not also proscribe
retaliation. Without a ban on retaliation, opportunistic employers would be able,
as a practical matter, to insulate themselves from discrimination claims by
making it clear to employees that any complaint of discrimination would be met
with the most dire consequences at the workplace and beyond. Few employees
would risk their jobs by complaining of discrimination. Thus, based on
Burlington and Gomez-Perez, it is possible to characterize Justice Alito as a mild
pragmatist. In Burlington, he rejected a plain meaning argument because of a
pragmatic concern that relying on the text would expand the scope of Title VII
protection against retaliation too far,160 and in Gomez-Perez, he followed the
generally pragmatic approach of Justice Breyer in Burlington.161
While Justice Alito’s approach in these two cases seems at some level to be
pragmatic, that judgment must be viewed in light of his opinion in an important
Title VII decision dealing not with retaliation but with time limits for filing
discrimination claims—the 2007 decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co.162 In Ledbetter, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Alito, held that
each pay-setting decision is a “discrete act” so that the 180-day filing period for
discrimination claims begins when the act occurs,163 even if the employee is
unaware that the act, along with the discrete acts of setting the salaries of other
workers, constituted salary discrimination.164 Ledbetter apparently knew that her
supervising manager had given her low job evaluations, which she thought

159. A pragmatist might nevertheless balance the outcome this way because opportunistic
employers might have greater difficulty finding ways to retaliate beyond the workplace, and a
broader rule might be seen as having the consequence of intruding too far into employer autonomy.
160. See supra notes 119–28 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
162. 550 U.S. 618 (2007). Ledbetter proved to be such a controversial decision that one of
President Barack Obama’s first acts as President of the United States was to sign a law that
superseded the opinion. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, §§ 2, 4, 123
Stat. 5, 5–6 (amending Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 7(d), 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)
(2006)).
163. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628.
164. Id. at 642.
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happened because she was a woman.165 By the time Ledbetter retired from
Goodyear, she was making substantially less money than any of her similarly
situated male colleagues.166
Justice Alito, as he subsequently did in his opinion in Gomez-Perez,167
looked to precedent in writing the Ledbetter opinion.168 This time, instead of
finding one stream of authority—such as the Sullivan decision later followed in
Jackson—he found two. In the first stream of cases, the Court had dismissed the
plaintiffs’ complaints of discrimination because the plaintiffs had not timely
challenged the discriminatory conduct. However, Justice Alito also noted a
second stream of authority—including Congressional action and at least one
subsequent Supreme Court case—that suggested a more liberal approach to the
time-barring challenges to alleged employment discrimination.
In Ledbetter, Justice Alito looked to United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,169
which had insulated from legal challenge the present effects of an earlier policy
requiring female flight attendants to be unmarried.170 In Evans, the employer
discharged the plaintiff because she was married, but she did not challenge her
dismissal.171 Once the employer ended the discriminatory policy because of
litigation brought by other flight attendants, the plaintiff applied and her
employer rehired her.172 The airline treated her as a new employee without
giving her seniority credit for her prior service.173 Substantively, this case was
very important since the Burger Court used it to reject the “present effects of past
discrimination” theory of discrimination.174 Procedurally, the abrogation of that
substantive theory left the plaintiff without a remedy: the plaintiff had not timely
challenged her discharge when she got married, and without the present effects
theory of discrimination, there was nothing discriminatory about treating her as a
new employee without seniority when her employer rehired her.175
Justice Alito also discussed Delaware State College v. Ricks,176 where a
plaintiff was time-barred from bringing his Title VII complaint because he had
pursued internal remedies, waiting to file until his terminal year as a professor

165. Id. at 621–22.
166. Id. at 622.
167. See supra notes 138–44 and accompanying text.
168. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 624–32.
169. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
170. Id. at 558.
171. Id. at 554–55.
172. Id. at 555.
173. Id.
174. See Case Comment, Past Discrimination and Present Violations of Title VII: Farris v.
Board of Education, 92 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757 (1979) (citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431
U.S. 553, 558 (1977)).
175. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 625 (2007) (quoting Evans, 431
U.S. at 558).
176. 449 U.S. 250 (1980), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, § 112, 105 Stat. 1071, 1078–79.
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had expired.177 The discrete act of discrimination occurred when the plaintiff’s
employer initially notified him that it would not renew his contract beyond that
terminal year.178
Finally, Justice Alito discussed Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,179
where women workers filed discrimination claims when their employer laid
them off because they had less seniority than they would have had if, years
earlier, the employer had not modified the seniority system to advantage male
workers.180 Their claim was time-barred because the plaintiffs did not file it
when the employer modified the seniority system.181
However, Justice Alito also considered a second strain of reasoning found in
precedent. Congress, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, had rejected Lorance by
amending Title VII to allow challenges to seniority systems “when the seniority
system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the seniority system,
or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of the seniority system
or provision of the system.” 182 This applies “whether or not that discriminatory
purpose is apparent on the face of the seniority provision.”183 Further, in

177. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 626 (citing Ricks, 449 U.S. at 252–54, 258).
178. Id. (citing Ricks, 449 U.S. at 252–53).
179. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
180. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 627 (citing Lorance, 490 U.S. at 902–03).
181. Id. (citing Lorance, 490 U.S. at 911).
182. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 105 Stat. 1071, 1078–79
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (2000)). Unlike Justice Breyer’s approach to congressional
override in CBOCS West where Congress overrode the prior decision and the law reverted to its
earlier status, see supra note 110 and accompanying text, Justice Alito continued to rely on the
rationale the Court relied upon in Lorance even though Congress had rejected the outcome, see 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2). In a footnote, he described why the override did not undermine the rationale
of Lorance:
After Lorance, Congress amended Title VII to cover the specific situation involved in
that case. The dissent attaches great significance to this amendment, suggesting that it
shows that Lorance was wrongly reasoned as an initial matter. However, the very
legislative history cited by the dissent explains that this amendment and the other 1991
Title VII amendments ‘“expand[ed] the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to
provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.’” For present purposes, what is
most important about the amendment in question is that it applied only to the adoption of
a discriminatory seniority system, not to other types of employment discrimination.
Evans and Ricks, upon which Lorance relied, and which employed identical reasoning,
were left in place, and these decisions are more than sufficient to support our holding
today.
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 627 n.2 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). See Widiss, supra note
110, at 512, for further discussion of the way courts look at decisions that the legislature overrides.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2). To be critical of Congress, when it addressed Lorance, it
should have addressed more broadly the problems of injustice associated with Title VII’s short
filing period and the restrictive interpretation not only in Lorance but in Ricks and Evans as well.
Nevertheless, a liberal approach to statutory interpretation would find a broader purpose to this
amendment, requiring the Court to at least rethink more generally its approach to the short filing
period problems. Of course, the need to assemble supermajority support for amendments to
controversial legislation may require compromises that result in a law that is less than ideal.
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Bazemore v. Friday,184 the Court had found timely a pay discrimination claim
filed years after two racially segregated branches of the employer merged
together without removing the pay differentials that had been part of the earlier,
segregated system.185
Justice Alito appears to have adopted the reasoning from the former stream
of cases, and in so doing pursued an extremely formalistic path in Ledbetter.
Disregarding the consequences of barring Ledbetter’s claim, he found that
discrete acts by the plaintiff’s supervisor caused the significant difference in
salaries between the plaintiff and her male coworkers even though the plaintiff
did not discover that fact until years later.186 Because those discrete acts occurred
long before, plaintiff’s claim could not reach them.187
Ledbetter is a stunningly perverse decision.188 It denied the plaintiff’s claim
as time-barred even though she did not know of the higher salaries of her
coworkers during the period when she could have filed a timely claim.189
Ledbetter knew that her supervisors had given her what she thought were
discriminatory evaluations, but she did not know at that time the salaries of her
coworkers who did similar work.190 Simply being told what your salary is to be
triggers the start of the 180-day time limit, even when the employee has no
further information about potential discrimination. The Court blamed Ledbetter
for not filing a discrimination claim with the first paycheck after her evaluations
and every paycheck thereafter: “Ledbetter should have filed an EEOC charge
within 180 days after each allegedly discriminatory pay decision was made and
communicated to her.”191
While the Court appears to leave open the possibility that a discovery rule
could mitigate the harshness of its decision in Ledbetter,192 it is hard to believe

184. 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam).
185. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 633 (citing Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 386–87, 390–91, 395–96).
186. See id. at 621–22.
187. Id. at 628.
188. Cf. Deborah L. Brake, What Counts as “Discrimination” in Ledbetter and the
Implications for Sex Equality Law, 59 S.C. L. REV. 657, 672 (“The Court's recent Ledbetter decision
is much more than a narrow, procedural ruling interpreting Title VII's filing deadlines. It is the
product of a Court that has taken an increasingly narrow view of the proper role of law in
remedying gender inequality.”).
189. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
190. Id. Only a small proportion of all employees know their coworkers’ salaries since there is
little transparency about salaries. See, e.g., Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, “Love, Sex and
Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way”: Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 167, 168, 171 (2004) (stating that one-third of private sector employers have adopted
specific rules prohibiting employees from discussing their wages with coworkers; only one in ten
employers has adopted a pay openness policy).
191. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628. This sentence may demand too much from an employee.
Although Ledbetter knew her salary, she did not, at the time her pay was set, know that it was
discriminatory because she did not know the salaries of her coworkers.
192. Id. at 642 n.10. A discovery rule would in essence only begin the filing period once the
employee knew facts sufficient to make clear at least the possibility that she was the victim of
discrimination. See generally Brake & Grossman, supra note 86, at 874–78 (explaining the
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that Congress could have meant courts to interpret the short filing period, which
Congress intended to serve the purpose of quickly resolving discrimination
claims,193 to cut off claims before the potential claimant knew facts sufficient to
support a claim of discrimination. While it is, of course, theoretically possible
that Congress could have intended such a result (even though it is bizarre), a
pragmatic judge would reach that conclusion only with the strongest proof. No
such proof is present as to the Title VII filing periods.
A pragmatic approach would not only consider the consequences to the
particular plaintiff but would also evaluate the consequences more broadly. It is
with this broader perspective that the true perversity of Ledbetter becomes clear,
even from the viewpoint of someone who favors employers over employees.
Because the filing period begins to run when the discrete act of setting a salary
occurs,194 each employee whose salary the employer alters has a legally-created
incentive—if the employee is to safeguard claims of wage discrimination—to
file a wage discrimination claim even in the absence of full information as to
whether the salary determination was discriminatory. Further, every time the
employer modifies the salary for a second employee who might be a potential
comparator for the first employee,195 the first employee has an incentive to file a
wage discrimination claim because the modification may be a discrete act
establishing when discrimination first occurs and when the filing period starts to
run. Since few employees are aware of the salaries of potential comparators or
when the employer sets the salaries for these employees,196 all employees have,
as a result of Ledbetter, a strong incentive to file a wage discrimination claim
every time they receive their wages.197
Looking only at the bizarre consequences of Ledbetter, Justice Alito’s
approach to judicial decision making must be considered extremely formalistic;
indeed, his position resulted in undermining Title VII wage discrimination
claims. But after the 2007 Term, that may no longer be a complete view. Putting
Ledbetter together with his opinions in the two retaliation cases moves him from
the position of an extreme formalist toward somewhat of a pragmatist.

discovery rule and describing lower courts’ approaches in applying the discovery rule to Title VII
claims).
193. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 629–30 (quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825
(1980)).
194. Id. at 628.
195. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by
Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 193–97 (2009) (discussing the increasing use of “comparator”
proof to show disparate treatment). A comparator is “someone whose treatment by the employer
may be an adequate basis for inferring discrimination against the plaintiff.” Id. at 193.
196. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
197. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 86, at 866–87, for an interesting discussion of the
interaction of Ledbetter and Burlington. Obviously, if employees did undertake to protect their
potential discrimination claims by filing claims every pay period, employers would likely respond
with the kinds of retaliation that occurs all too frequently. Thus, there would be a tremendous
increase in the number of retaliation charges filed that would correlate with the increase in filings of
discrimination charges.
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C. Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas also wrote two opinions in the three retaliation decisions
discussed above, dissenting in both CBOCS West198 and Gomez-Perez.199 In
CBOCS West, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, opened with a plain
meaning argument that § 1981 does not cover retaliation because it does not
include the term “retaliation.”200 That argument is problematic because § 1981
also does not include in its text the term “discriminate.”201 Thus, Justice Thomas
quickly moved beyond the plain meaning argument by conceding that, despite
the absence of the language in the statute, a ban on discrimination because of
race “is the clear import of its terms.”202 But for him, “[r]etaliation is not
discrimination based on race.”203 This is consistent with his view that § 1981 is
limited to a very narrow, equal treatment test of discrimination, one that would
not affirmatively guarantee any rights.204 In his view, retaliation violates § 1981
only if the defendant violated equal treatment by, for example, having different
retaliation policies for blacks and whites.205 For example, an employer would
violate § 1981 if it retaliated only against blacks who complained of
discrimination but not whites. However, a policy of retaliating against everyone
who complains of discrimination would not violate § 1981. From his point of
view, it would be wrong to find that retaliation violated § 1981 because doing so
would involve a positive right against race discrimination.206 The underpinning
of Justice Thomas’s whole approach is that, for him, retaliation is fundamentally
different from discrimination and the discrimination § 1981 proscribes is quite
limited.207 Thus, he continues to assert that the somewhat broader approach of

198. CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1961–70 (2008) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
199. Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1951 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
200. See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1961.
201. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2000).
202. CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1962 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 1963. Justice Thomas’s approach evokes earlier approaches limiting the conceptual
scope of discrimination. For example, the Court found that pregnancy discrimination was not sex
discrimination. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976). Congress overturned that
narrow definition of discrimination by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. See
Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)). Early
on, the courts did not find that sexual harassment was sex discrimination, and even comparatively
recently some lower courts had found that same-sex harassment could not be sex discrimination.
See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77, 82 (1998) (noting that both
lower courts held a male worker had no cause of action for being harassed by his male coworker;
the Supreme Court reversed, holding “same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII”).
204. This is also consistent with Justice Thomas’s narrow view of the scope of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349–78
(2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
205. See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1963 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
206. Id.
207. See id. at 1965.
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Justice O’Connor in Jackson (on which Justice Alito relied in CBOCS West)208 is
erroneous.209 The Jackson Court found that intentional retaliatory action taken
against an employee for challenging discrimination was itself a form of
discrimination because the action is different treatment than the employee would
have received absent the discrimination claim.210
In Gomez-Perez, Justice Thomas, again joined by Justice Scalia, dissented,
reasserting his view stated in Jackson that a proscription of discrimination never
encompasses retaliation.211 For him, if Congress wants to ban retaliation it must
do so expressly.212
Characterizing Justice Thomas as a formalist or pragmatist is not difficult. In
CBOCS West, he appears forced by the absence of the term “discriminate” to
give up his textualist argument that § 1981 does not proscribe retaliation because
it does not include the term “retaliation.”213 He does hold strongly to his
formalist position that the hollow equal treatment notion of what constitutes
discrimination limits the scope of § 1981,214 but he made no attempt here to
articulate why his narrow approach has favorable consequences.
D. Chief Justice Roberts
Chief Justice Roberts, who joined the majority opinions in Burlington215and
CBOCS West,216 dissented in Gomez-Perez,217 joined by Justice Scalia and joined
in part by Justice Thomas.218 In Part I of the dissent, the Chief Justice accepted
Sullivan and Jackson but distinguished them.219 Based on this precedent, he
agreed that “broad antidiscrimination provisions may also encompass an
antiretaliation component.”220 However, he argued that “it cannot be . . . that any
time Congress proscribes ‘discrimination based on X,’ it means to proscribe

208. See supra notes 145–51 and accompanying text.
209. See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1964 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
210. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 180 (2005).
211. See Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1951 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
212. See id. This is a good example of textualism that operates to substantially restrict the
scope of application of a statutory provision because a court will read the statute as not applicable to
any situation it does not expressly cover.
213. See supra notes 200–03 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 204–07 and accompanying text.
215. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 55 (2006).
216. CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1954 (2008).
217. Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1943 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
218. Id. Justice Thomas did not join in Part I of the dissent because the Chief Justice took a
position inconsistent with Justice Thomas’s position that the Court wrongly decided Jackson and
CBOCS West. See id. at 1951 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 1943–45 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 1944.
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retaliation as well.” 221 CBOCS West is, for him, one of those situations where
retaliation is included, although it is not in Gomez-Perez.222
Chief Justice Roberts then referred to Burlington for the proposition that a
claim of retaliation is conceptually different from a claim of discrimination
because discrimination deals with the status of an employee—a worker treated
differently because she is over age forty—while retaliation deals with conduct—
a worker who complains of age discrimination.223 He traced various arguments to
show that Congress did not intend to include retaliation within the proscription
of the ban on age discrimination for federal sector employees.224
More important to the Chief Justice than the subtle statutory distinctions he
assembled to support his conclusion was a claim based on legislative purpose. In
other words, he looked to “why . . . Congress [would] allow retaliation suits
against private-sector and state employers, but not against the Federal
Government.”225 For him, Congress was familiar with the civil service
protections available to federal employees that were not available to employees
in the private sector.226 He traced the history of the proscription of discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin which protected
workers from, among other things, reprisal, and which came into being before an
executive order extended Title VII to federal sector employees.227 The Civil
Service Commission regulations created a scheme by which federal employees
could vindicate their rights, including the right not to be the victim of
retaliation.228 Though revised, those regulations continued in effect after the

221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1945. Justice Breyer in Burlington uses the distinction between status and conduct
to show how, on one hand, the specific employment situations further specified in § 703(a) define
the scope of that section’s proscription of discrimination because of status while, on the other hand,
§ 704(a)’s proscription of retaliation involves the employer’s response to the conduct of the
employee of complaining of discrimination. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53, 61–64 (2006). The Chief Justice in Gomez-Perez turns that distinction around to say that
the ADEA’s proscription of discrimination, because of the status of being over age forty for federal
sector employees, does not address the protection of the employee for the conduct of having
complained of discrimination. Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1943–44 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
224. Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1945–50 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). His first point is that the
ADEA’s provisions dealing with the private sector specify retaliation, but the federal sector
provision does not. Id. at 1945–46. Rather than differentiating the general nature of the federal
sector provisions from the laundry list of specific applications in the private sector provisions, he
finds in this a congressional intent not to prohibit retaliation as to federal employees. Id. To bolster
that, the Chief Justice pointed to Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981). The Lehman Court
differentiated the private sector provisions of the ADEA, which courts have construed to provide for
trial by jury, from the federal sector provision, which the Court found did not include by implication
a right to trial by jury. Id. at 162–63.
225. Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1948 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1948–49.
228. Id. at 1948.
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executive order extended Title VII to federal employees.229 When Congress
extended the ADEA to federal employees, the Civil Service Commission revised
its regulations to extend protections against age discrimination, including
retaliation for having complained of age discrimination.230 Thus, for Chief
Justice Roberts, the comprehensive nature of the Commission’s protection
against retaliation explains why Congress did not intend to include retaliation
within the proscriptions of age discrimination when it enacted § 633a(a).
The position of the Chief Justice is quite problematic. As Justice Alito noted,
there is no support in the ADEA, its structure, or the legislative history of its
amendment adding § 633a(a) that Congress intended not to include retaliation in
§ 633a(a) because the Civil Service Commission might subsequently ban
retaliation by regulation.231 Further, the legislative history of § 717 of Title VII,
the provision Congress channeled when it enacted § 633a(a), suggests that
Congress intended to make these antidiscrimination provisions applicable to
federal employees because the civil service system had been inadequate to
redress discrimination, thereby justifying added measures.232
By joining the pro-employee decisions in Burlington and CBOCS West,
Chief Justice Roberts can probably be seen as adopting a pragmatic approach
similar to that of Justice Breyer’s. Chief Justice Roberts’s position in his dissent
in Gomez-Perez may indicate that he does not approach all statutory
interpretation from a strictly pragmatic perspective, just as Justice Alito’s
opinion in Ledbetter suggests that Justice Alito sometimes approaches statutory
interpretation with a more formalist inclination.233 However, Chief Justice
Roberts’s rationale for the dissent follows a pragmatic approach because he
looks to the consequences of his position; he assumes that the Civil Service
Commission will step forward with regulations banning retaliation.234 Perhaps he
is not acting out of pragmatism but instead is responding to the contemporary
debate about the scope of powers of the Executive. While a full discussion of
this question is beyond the scope of this Article, Chief Justice Roberts’s
approach involves a healthy dose of deference to the Executive. This deference

229. Id. at 1948–49.
230. Id. at 1949.
231. Id. at 1942 & n.6.
232. The main rationale for adding § 717 to Title VII was that the preexisting system,
administered by the Civil Service Commission, had failed to redress discrimination in federal sector
employment. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 23–24 (1971), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, S.
COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 83–84 (1972). The amendment extending the ADEA to federal
sector employees was only a small part of a much larger project of extending the minimum wage
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to public sector employees. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-913,
at 2–3 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2811–12. There is little legislative history
beyond an indication that federal employees deserved the same protection against age
discrimination that other employees had. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-913, at 40–41, as reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2849–50.
233. See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text.
234. See Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1942 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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can be characterized as political235 in the sense that such a position appears more
sympathetic to a “unitary executive” theory of separation of powers.236 If this is
true, then one way of synthesizing Chief Justice Roberts’s approach in the two
2007 Term retaliation decisions is that he chose to defer to the Executive’s
position in both cases—finding for the employee in CBOCS West but for the
federal government employer in Gomez-Perez.
IV. THE JUSTICES ON A SPECTRUM FROM PRAGMATIC TO FORMALIST
A classic “liberal” approach to statutory interpretation, used in the sense of
traditional American jurisprudence and not politics,237 first asks whether or not
the statute is social legislation.238 If the statute is social legislation, then courts
should construe it broadly so that its remedial objectives will likely be fully
realized.239 Antidiscrimination laws are very good examples of social

235. See supra note 3.
236. One thrust of the unitary executive theory is that the President will not be able to fulfill
the constitutional function as the sole executive without complete control over all aspects of the
federal government, including control of all of its employees. For a description of the concrete
aspects of governance involved in the scope of this theory and how it has developed from President
Ronald Reagan to President George W. Bush, see Harold J. Krent, From a Unitary to a Unilateral
Presidency, 88 B.U. L. REV. 523, 523–59 (2008). For a seminal article on the “unitary executive”
theory, see generally Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1155 (1992) (arguing that the President retains
supervisory control over all executive officers). The George W. Bush administration relied heavily
on broad assertions of the unitary executive theory. Ironically, Justice Alito may have initiated the
contemporary debate over the “unitary executive” theory, at least in those terms, when he served in
the Office of Legal Counsel of the Reagan Justice Department in the mid-1980s. See Jess Bravin,
Judge Alito’s View of the Presidency: Expansive Powers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2006, at A1.
237. “Liberal” here means in the policy sense, not the sense of party politics. See NEIL
DUXBURY, P ATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 161–91, 229 (1995).
238. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 64, § 73:1, at 741–43. Social legislation, often called
“general welfare” legislation, is legislation that seeks to promote the common good, see id. at 741,
generally by protecting and assisting the weaker members of society.
239. Id. at 741–42. Presumably, underlying this approach is the assumption that if a court gets
the interpretation wrong it is better to have the error work in favor of those needing protection. With
statutes that courts do not find to be social legislation, the consequences of an error in interpretation
are worse if a court wrongly extends the reach of the law too far. To say it another, more
statistically-oriented way, the question is whether there is a social policy that would cause the
decider to choose between a “false inculpation” or a “false exculpation” error. See Neil B. Cohen,
Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 385, 409–11 (1985).
Justice Scalia views the canon that “remedial statutes are to be liberally construed” as a
“canard.” See Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 581, 581–86 (1990). He rejects the canon because the goal of interpretation with “respect to
any statute, should be neither liberally to expand nor strictly to constrict its meaning, but rather to
get the meaning precisely right.” Id. at 582. For him, this interpretive tool might interfere with
achieving that goal. Id. But he fails to recognize what to do when reaching that goal is subject to
doubt. More humble jurists might not be as confident that they can achieve the goal of a “precisely
right” interpretation of the statute and so they do worry about the consequences of getting it wrong.
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legislation.240 If broadly construing social legislation is a good litmus test of a
liberal approach to judicial decision making, none of the Justices who wrote
opinions in any of the retaliation cases discussed above can be considered to
have adopted a liberal approach. To say this another way, this traditional method
of interpretation is not part of the current approach of any of the Justices to
statutory interpretation. Indeed, the last time the Court said it was using the
approach of broadly construing social legislation was in 1980 in an opinion by
Justice Stewart in Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall.241 In that case, upholding a
regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Labor, the Court said “safety
legislation is to be liberally construed to effectuate the congressional purpose.”242
Construing the three statutes involved in the three retaliation cases liberally,
a jurist would ask if proscribing retaliation would best achieve the objectives of
these statutes.243 Justice Alito’s reliance in Gomez-Perez on the rationale Justice
O’Connor used in Jackson244 only partly addresses the underlying issue of
whether a proscription of retaliation is necessary to actually proscribe
discrimination. If an employer faces no liability for retaliation, that creates a
strong incentive for the employer to either promulgate a policy or follow a
practice of discharging every employee who complains. That approach
essentially shelters the employer from liability for all underlying discrimination
claims, short of a claim that the employer discharged the employee because of
discrimination.245 The employer could further insulate itself even from claims of
discriminatory discharge by claiming that retaliation was a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge.246 Finally, the employer could have a
policy or practice of “blackballing” all employees or former employees who
complain that their dismissal was discriminatory. This is in line with, but is an

Judge Learned Hand suggested that he “should like to have every court begin, ‘I beseech ye in the
bowels of Christ, think that we may be mistaken.’” THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: P APERS AND
ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 230 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1960). Hand was quoting Oliver
Cromwell, who was making the same suggestion to the Church of Scotland. See id. at xxiv–xxv.
240. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418–19 (1975); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–01 (1973).
241. 445 U.S. 1 (1980). Later, the Supreme Court, in a Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) case, did not say that courts should construe
remedial statutes broadly, see United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55–73 (1998), even though
the lower courts in the same case had examined that concept in reference to CERCLA, see United
States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572, 578 (6th Cir. 1997); CPC Int’l, Inc. v.
Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 571 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
242. Marshall, 445 U.S. at 13 (citing United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798
(1969); Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 486 (1943)).
243. A more pointed question would be to ask if Congress intended only to appear to be
proscribing discrimination while not actually banning discrimination by enabling employers to take
retaliatory actions to prevent employees from advancing claims of discrimination.
244. See supra notes 138–51 and accompanying text.
245. Essentially, this is how Justice Thomas interprets § 1981, because in his view it does not
expressly proscribe retaliation. See supra notes 200–10.
246. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612 (1993) (stating that an illegal reason
for discharge can be legitimately nondiscriminatory).
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even more extreme form of, the prophylactic rule that some lower courts have
implemented that only allows claims of discrimination to proceed to trial that
involve such “ultimate employment” decisions as discharge.247 Justices Alito and
O’Connor perhaps saw a glimmer of this very real prospect by their treatment of
retaliation as a form of discrimination. But the classic liberal approach would
attempt to construe these antidiscrimination statutes so that they would work to
abrogate discrimination. Absent the strongest text to the contrary, liberal jurists
would not construe an antidiscrimination statute to allow any discriminatory or
retaliatory acts by the employer to escape scrutiny just because a court might
find the acts not sufficiently important to merit scarce judicial attention. The fact
that none of the Justices writing opinions in these retaliation cases took a liberal
approach may support the inference that there is no liberal among them.248
Rather than asking whether these statutes were social legislation to be
broadly construed, the Justices writing for the Court in all three of the retaliation
decisions started by relying on precedent. Justice Breyer began his opinion in
Burlington by citing to Jackson.249 He also explicitly based his opinion in
CBOCS West on stare decisis.250 Justice Alito in Gomez-Perez and Ledbetter
does not mention the doctrine of stare decisis but moves right to discussing the
relevant precedent.251 While none of the three decisions involved precedent
directly on point, all three involved areas where the authority moved in one
direction—finding the plaintiff protected against retaliation.
For Justice Breyer in CBOCS West, the strong precedent was Sullivan, which
found that the proscriptions of § 1982, a companion statute to § 1981, included
retaliation.252 One problem in Sullivan was that the Court did not use the word
“retaliation” to describe Sullivan’s claim but did use the word “standing”
instead.253 Without using the term, however, it is clear that Sullivan’s claim was

247. See, e.g., Lisa M. Durham Taylor, Parsing Supreme Court Dicta to Adjudicate NonWorkplace Harms, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 75, 84 & n.36 (2008) (noting cases where federal courts of
appeal have required ultimate employment actions before allowing retaliation claims).
248. Had Justice Breyer utilized his “reasonable member of Congress” test to determine
legislative purpose, it is possible that his analysis might approach a liberal one. See BREYER, supra
note 52, at 87–88. But he did not appear to rely on that concept in either Burlington or CBOCS
West.
249. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59 (2006).
250. See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2008).
251. See Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1936 (2008); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 624 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-2, §§ 2, 4, 123 Stat. 5, 5–6 (amending Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 § 7(d), 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2006)).
252. CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1955.
253. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969). The Court described
Sullivan’s claim as follows:
We turn to Sullivan’s expulsion for the advocacy of Freeman’s cause. If that
sanction, backed by a state court judgment, can be imposed, then Sullivan is punished for
trying to vindicate the rights of minorities protected by § 1982. Such a sanction would
give impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions on property. That is why we said in
[Barrows] that the white owner is at times “the only effective adversary” of the unlawful
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one for retaliation by the corporation against him directly and not in some
capacity representing the interests of his lessee.254 Justice Breyer avoided the
problem in CBOCS West by again citing precedent; this time, he used the
decision of the Rehnquist Court in Jackson, which states that the Sullivan Court
interpreted § 1982 “to cover retaliation against those who advocate the rights of
groups protected by that prohibition.” 255 The next step was to look to precedent
that courts are to read §§ 1981 and 1982 together. Given “the sister statutes’
common language, origin, and purposes,” Justice Breyer cited Runyon for the
proposition that courts should read the two sections alike.256 Because precedent
from § 1982 applies to § 1981, the fact that § 1982 proscribed retaliation made it
easy to conclude that § 1981 did so as well.
Relying on precedent—stare decisis—is at first glance formalistic, but it is
common for pragmatists to rely on it as well. In CBOCS West, Justice Breyer
simply filled out the interpretation that had come before; he took that authority
one small step in the same direction that courts had followed since the late
1960s.257 As Judge Posner sees it, external and internal restraints constrain
pragmatic judges.258 Precedent is one of the external restraints.259 Pragmatism
differs from formalism only once the use of formalist tools, including text and
precedent, still leave a question open.260
Justice Breyer may have judged both Burlington and CBOCS West as being
sufficiently determined by precedent and not leaving an open question that
would require greater pragmatic exploration of the consequences.261 To say it
another way, it would have taken a radically different approach to come to a
different conclusion; indeed, the Court had seen the consequences of such
radicalism when Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to overturn a
series of radical Supreme Court decisions in a number of civil rights areas.
Congress had quickly rebuffed the Rehnquist Court’s decision in Patterson.262
It is interesting to note that the way Justice Breyer in CBOCS West dealt
with Patterson and Congress’s subsequent repudiation further reinforces the
cautious nature of the approach taken to statutory interpretation in this area of
the law. Rather than acknowledging that Congress had reacted very negatively to

restrictive covenant. Under the terms of our decision in Barrows, there can be no
question but that Sullivan has standing to maintain this action.
Id. (quoting Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953)).
254. See id. at 234–37.
255. CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1955 (quoting Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S.
167, 176 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
256. CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1955–56 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 173
(1976)).
257. See id. at 1954–61.
258. See POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 3, at 259–60.
259. Id. at 260.
260. See id. at 260–64.
261. See supra Part III.A.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 104–10.
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Patterson’s significantly different approach to the statute as well as to the
Court’s other civil rights decisions in the 1988 term, Justice Breyer’s treatment
of Patterson seems to assume that the decision was simply a small deviation in
the interpretation of § 1981 that Congress corrected without much overall
impact.263 Perhaps Justice Breyer took this approach for collegial reasons,
thinking that quoting Jackson was a sufficient rebuke to his more conservative
colleagues.264
Only Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented in CBOCS West,265 with the two
newest members of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, joining
the majority. This may be some indication that the latter two justices are not as
rigidly formalistic as their more senior colleagues. An alternative explanation is
that they are more conservative266 (in the political sense) and as a result are more
likely to defer to Executive decisions that they see fall within the purview of the
Executive’s power. For example, the Solicitor General argued in CBOCS West
that Congress included retaliation within the conduct proscribed by § 1981, and
both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito agreed with that approach.267 But,
while Chief Justice Roberts was consistent in siding with the divergent positions
of the Executive in the two cases, Justice Alito limited his agreement to CBOCS
West and rejected the federal government’s position in Gomez-Perez, where the
Deputy Solicitor argued the government’s case.268

263. See supra text accompanying notes 109–12.
264. See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2008) (quoting Jackson v.
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 176 (2005)).
265. See id. at 1961 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
266. Judge Posner characterizes Justice Alito as “conservative,” but he uses the term in the
sense of politics. See POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 3, at 277–78.
267. See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1954.
268. See Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1935 (2008). To explore in more detail the
level of agreement between the Executive and Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, the author
examined every case in the Roberts Court era in which the Solicitor General filed briefs.
Specifically, the examination considered the Solicitor General’s requested outcome, whether the
outcome the Court granted paralleled the Solicitor General’s request, and whether Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito agreed with the Solicitor General’s position. The data is on file with the
author.
In the Roberts Court era, the Solicitor General has filed briefs in 66 cases. In 35 of these cases,
the Supreme Court accepted the position advanced by the Solicitor General. Where the Court
accepted the position of the Solicitor General, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito each failed to
agree with that position in only 1 case each. For Justice Alito, it was Greenlaw v. United States, 128
S. Ct. 2559, 2571 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting). Similarly, the Chief Justice joined Justice Scalia’s
dissenting opinion in Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education, 550 U.S. 81,
108 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In the 31 cases in which the Court did not accept the Solicitor
General’s position, Chief Justice Roberts agreed with the Solicitor General 8 times, while Justice
Alito agreed with him 11 times. In total, Justice Alito agreed with the Solicitor General in 45 of 66
cases while the Chief Justice agreed in 42. Thus, they are both somewhat more likely to defer to the
Executive’s position than is the Court overall.
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In Gomez-Perez, Justice Alito, writing for the Court, mentioned Sullivan but
primarily focused on Jackson as precedent.269 While not a case on all fours with
Gomez-Perez, Jackson provided good authority since the structure of the two
statutory prohibitions on discrimination—Title IX in Jackson and the federalsector provision in the ADEA here—are so similar.270 Since the Jackson Court
found a retaliation claim to be within the general ban on sex discrimination in
Title IX,271 it was an easy step to find that Congress included retaliation in the
similarly broad ban on age discrimination in § 633a(a) of the ADEA, which
applied to federal sector employees. By siding with the Executive in CBOCS
West but not in Gomez-Perez, it may be that Justice Alito finds precedent more
important than deference to the Executive.
An alternative approach, one that is formalistic but reaches a different result,
is a plain meaning, text-based approach: because § 633a(a) does not expressly
include the term “retaliation” in its text,272 the section does not prohibit
retaliation. That argument, however, depends on whether the term “discriminate”
itself includes retaliation. Deciding whether discrimination includes retaliation
depends on an argument based on statutory structure. Not only are the structures
of Title IX and § 633a(a) similar in setting forth broad proscriptions of
discrimination,273 but these provisions are also quite different in structure from
those that apply to the private sector in the ADEA. Section 623(a) of the
ADEA’s ban on private sector employment discrimination sets forth a detailed
list of the different types of employment actions that violate the Act if done

269. See Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1936–41.
270. Both statutes involve a substantive ban on discrimination that is quite general. Compare
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006) (prohibiting
discrimination in educational programs or activities based on sex), with Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against an
employee because of age).
271. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005).
272. See 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a).
273. See id.
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because of age.274 Section 623(d) explicitly prohibits retaliation, but it is one
subsection of a laundry list of specific acts that this section prohibits.
The broader wording of both § 633a(a) and Title IX create the possibility
that the term “discriminate” means something different in different contexts.
When used in an open ended, general way, the term could include retaliation.
But the term may not include retaliation when Congress narrows it by linking it
to a list of specific aspects of employment. Finding that the term “discriminate”
has different meanings in different contexts is a position that a pure textualist
might find disturbing. To justify reaching beyond plain-meaning textualism,
Justice Alito quotes at length the rationale Justice O’Connor provided in
Jackson.275 This comes close to the purposive approach Justice Breyer advanced
in his theoretical work and in his Burlington opinion.276 Thus, Justice Alito’s
analysis here may reflect a more pragmatic approach to making decisions.
So, why did Justice Alito seem to change his approach so much from the
prior year’s decision in Ledbetter? In Ledbetter, Justice Alito had two divergent
streams of precedent to rely on.277 One applied the short filing periods strictly
and the other more liberally. Those precedents started with the narrowing
approach used in the Burger Court era to stop the liberal momentum from the
Warren Court era.278 In other words, there was no liberal Warren Court precedent
to set the law moving in a broader way in Ledbetter as there was in GomezPerez. The Burger Court decision in Evans was fundamentally important as a

274. See id. § 623(a). Section 623(a) provides:
(a) Employer Practices.
It shall be unlawful for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.
Section 623(b) prohibits age discrimination by employment agencies, and § 623(c) does the same
for labor organizations. Section 623(d) then proscribes retaliation:
(d) Opposition to unlawful practices; participation in investigations, proceedings, or
litigation.
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or
applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discriminate against any
individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or
applicant for membership, because such individual, member or applicant for
membership has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or beause such
individual, member or applicant for membership has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation
under this chapter.
Finally, § 623(e) bans discriminatory job postings.
275. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
276. See supra Part III.A.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 167–84.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 167–94.
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matter of substantive law because it abrogated the most liberal, far reaching
definition of discrimination—the present effects of past discrimination test—that
the lower courts had developed during the Warren Court era.279 At the time the
Court decided Evans, the procedural consequences were secondary, but the
abrogation of the present effects test of discrimination set in motion the
narrowed jurisprudence that Justice Alito relied on in Ledbetter.280
Putting Gomez-Perez together with Ledbetter supports the conclusion that
both decisions reflect formalist thinking. In Gomez-Perez, there was consistent
precedent, though no Supreme Court decision on all fours, supporting the
conclusion that the general proscription of age discrimination applicable to
federal sector employees included retaliation.281 Thus, both a formalist and a
pragmatist would likely reach the same conclusion. In contrast, in Ledbetter,
there was a conflict in precedent and the Court had to pick which of the two
cases to follow.282 Thus, Ledbetter presented an open case. From a pragmatic
point of view, the way to resolve an open case is to look at the likely
consequences of the decision. The bizarre and perverse consequences of picking
the path the Court followed to bar Ledbetter’s claim would not be the approach a
pragmatist would likely decide to take. Presumably, thinking formalistically,
Justice Alito applied what he considered to be the closest precedent without
regard to the consequences.
If Justice Alito was so formalistic in Ledbetter, what explains his opinion in
Gomez-Perez? It may be possible that the best explanation for Justice Alito’s
pro-employee position in Gomez-Perez is that he reacted to all the criticism that
his opinion in Ledbetter evoked and the attempts in Congress to overturn it.283 If
this is true, he may have become more sensitive to the consequences of his
approach to decision making. In other words, this may show that he has been
educated to move toward a more pragmatic way of judicial decision making.
Unlike his position in CBOCS West, Chief Justice Roberts dissented from
the majority in Gomez-Perez.284 One explanation for his dissent may be that he is
deferring to the position of the Executive, just as he did in CBOCS West.285

279. See supra notes 169–75 and accompanying text.
280. As to the larger question of whether there are any liberal justices on the present Court, it
may be instructive that Justice Stevens was the author of Evans. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,
431 U.S. 553, 554 (1977). While he is thought to sit on the left end of the ideological spectrum of
the Justices on the Court today, that does not make him a liberal. But the fact that he joined the
dissent of Justice Ginsburg in Ledbetter, see Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S.
618, 643 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), may be some indication that, in fact, he has moved to the
left and not just stayed put while the Court moved to the right.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 138–44.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 168–84.
283. See, e.g., Brake & Grossman, supra note 86, at 933 & nn.384–85 (describing the
outpouring of criticism of Ledbetter).
284. Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1943–51 (2008).
285. It is interesting that Gomez-Perez and CBOCS West were argued one day apart, see
Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1931 (argued on February 19, 2008); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries,
128 S. Ct. 1951, 1951 (2008) (argued on February 20, 2008), and the government took conflicting
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Looking for an alternative explanation seems reasonable since his stated reason
is quite tenuous: Congress meant to exclude retaliation from the proscription of
age discrimination in federal sector employment because it expected that the
Civil Service Commission would, by regulation, ban retaliation once Congress
extended the ban on age discrimination to the federal sector.286 Justice Alito
rejected the argument because there was no support for it in the text, or even the
Act’s legislative history, and it was self-contradictory.287
Among the Justices writing opinions in these cases, Justice Thomas sits on
the far right end of the spectrum; he generally takes a formalist approach. He
appears willing and able to take and maintain a strong position on his narrow
equal treatment view of what § 1981 applies to288 as well as to continue to resist
the precedent established in Jackson, a case in which he issued a strong dissent.
Justice Breyer sits the farthest on the left. But the left end of the spectrum is not
liberal; instead it is pragmatic. The right end is formalist. Based only on his
retaliation opinions, Justice Alito seems to be close to Justice Breyer. But he
moves toward the formalist end of the spectrum if his opinion in Ledbetter is
considered. The Chief Justice is similarly hard to place. On one hand, he fully
joined the majority in Burlington and CBOCS West, but he dissented on weaker

positions in each. Where it was the defendant–employer in Gomez-Perez, it opposed finding the
general prohibition of discrimination applicable to federal employees proscribed retaliation. See
Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1935. But in CBOCS West, the government argued that § 1981 included
retaliation within its scope of application. See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1954. The Deputy
Solicitor General argued Gomez-Perez, see Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Gomez-Perez, 128 S.
Ct. 1931 (No. 06-1321), while the Solicitor General presented the government’s position in CBOCS
West, see Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (No. 06-1431).
286. Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1949.
287. Id. at 1942. One might ask why Justice Alito did not defer to the authority of the
Executive in Gomez-Perez. This may sound silly, but perhaps he is more refined in his instinct to
defer to the government, and he deferred to the Solicitor General’s position in CBOCS West but did
not feel the need to defer to the Deputy Solicitor General’s argument in Gomez-Perez. This may
flow from Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
which dealt with judicial deference to administrative agency determinations of their underlying
statutes. See id. at 843–45. In a post-Chevron case dealing with an issue about the meaning of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), Justice
Scalia took the position that the Court should defer when the government has taken a definitive
legal position:
[T]he position that the county’s action in this case was unlawful unless permitted by the
terms of an agreement with the sheriff’s department employees warrants Chevron
deference if it represents the authoritative view of the Department of Labor. The fact that
it appears in a single opinion letter signed by the Acting Administrator of the Wage and
Hour Division might not alone persuade me that it occupies that status. But the Solicitor
General of the United States, appearing as an amicus in this action, has filed a brief,
cosigned by the Solicitor of Labor, which represents the position set forth in the opinion
letter to be the position of the Secretary of Labor. That alone, even without existence of
the opinion letter, would in my view entitle the position to Chevron deference.
Id. at 591 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
288. See supra notes 200, 204–07 and accompanying text.
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grounds in Gomez-Perez. Assuming he based his actions on deference to the
Executive, that makes him more politically motivated in his decision making.
V. CONCLUSION
The Justices who wrote opinions for the Roberts Court began with a rather
formalist approach of relying on precedent but also relied on pragmatism as well
to decide the two retaliation cases on its 2007 Term docket as well as Burlington
in its 2005 Term. From an employee-oriented point of view, it may be critical, at
least to Justice Alito, to find good authority from the Warren Court as a basis for
an argument from precedent. None of the Justices took what might be called a
traditionally liberal approach, but the cases were not of the type that might push
a Justice to address whether to proceed as a full-blown pragmatist. An interesting
wrinkle is the development of what might be called a new canon of statutory
interpretation that unless Congress expressly defines a term, reviewing courts
will deem Congress to have adopted the Court’s interpretation of that term, at
least if the Court decision is reasonably contemporaneous with Congress’s
action. In a sense, this development evokes a formalistic approach.
Having decided Burlington in 2006, CBOCS West and Gomez-Perez in
2008, and Crawford in 2009,289 the Court appears to consider the scope of
employee protection against retaliation to be an important question. The Court
has moved the law concerning retaliation forward, and as a result, a more robust
jurisprudence may develop.290

289. See supra note 1.
290. One cautionary note: the Court in Gomez-Perez made clear that the parties had not
challenged Sullivan or Jackson. See Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1937. This may suggest that the
Court is willing to overrule that precedent should its viability come before the Court.
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